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CHAPTER 6 
Corpora tions 
BERTRAM H. LOEWEN BERG 
§6.1. Cumulative voting legislation. In what appears to be a sur-
prising reversal of policy the 1956 session of the Massachusetts legisla-
ture l repealed a 1955 statute2 which for the first time had granted 
express statutory permission for the use of cumulative voting in busi-
ness corporations. Cumulative voting has been accurately described as 
a "device frequently employed to insure at least a minimum representa-
tion to minority stockholders" 3 on the board of directors.4 
The 1956 statute by restoring G.L., c. 156, §32 to its pre-1955 form 
has apparently invalidated cumulative voting in Massachusetts, a view 
which is supported not only by the language of the statute5 but both 
by administrative practice6 and by the action taken by the legislature 
on this subject during the 1955 and 1956 sessions. Corporations 
which adopted this device pursuant to the 1955 act presumably must 
henceforth 7 elect their directors under a noncumlJlative voting pro-
cedure, since a corporation organized under the General Laws is 
always subject to laws subsequently passed.s 
The most interesting aspect of this problem, of course, is the 
question as to why the legislature favored cumulative voting in 1955 
and opposed it in 1956. In the absence of committee reports some, at 
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§6.1. 1 Acts of 1956, c. 375. 
2 Acts of 1955, c. 173. 
81955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §6.1. 
4 The 1955 statute established the normal cumulative voting procedure under 
which each voting stockholder at the election of directors was entitled to a number 
of votes equal to the number of his shares of stock multiplied by the number of 
directors to be chosen with the right to cast all his votes for one director or to divide 
his votes as he saw fit. For a discussion of the mathematics involved in using this 
device, see 1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §6.1. 
5 "Stockholders entitled to vote shall ... have one vote for each share of stock 
owned by them ... " G.L., c. 156, §32. 
6 Officials at the Department of Corporations have indicated that prior to the 
passage of the 1955 statute provisions for cumulative voting in corporate organiza-
tion papers would have been rejected as invalid. 
7 The 1956 act was passed on May 18, 1956, and became effective ninety days later. 
Directors elected by cumulative voting pursuant to a provision in the agreement of 
association adopted while the 1955 act was in force were, of course, validly chosen 
and may serve out their terms. 
8 G.L., c. 155, §3. 
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least, of the possible answers to this question have been obtained 
through interviews by members of the Board of Student Editors of the 
ANNUAL SURVEY with various persons who were interested in the pas-
sage of the two acts. The proponents of the 1955 statute advanced 
the familiar argument that cumulative voting by permitting minority 
representation on the board of directors was a desirable practice, and 
that in view of the growing interest in this procedure in other juris-
dictions Massachusetts should keep pace in order to maintain its 
competitive position. 
Although there appears to have been no flood of new corporation,s 
with cumulative voting provisions, or of amendments by existing 
corporations to take advantage of the new act, the Associated Industries 
of Massachusetts urged the repeal of the 1955 statute, asserting that 
the adoption of cumulative voting led or would lead to proxy fights by 
groups seeking to obtain representation on the boards of corporations, 
and that fear of this development might discourage new industries from 
incorporating in Massachusetts. 
Whether the hopes of those favoring cumulative voting or the fears 
of those opposing it have more substance is difficult to determine. In 
any event no opposition to the 1956 proposal appeared, so that 
cumulative voting after a brief existence of slightly over one year has 
disappeared from the Massachusetts scene.9 
§6.2. Breaking the corporate deadlock. Zottu v. Electronic Heat-
ing Corp.,l although not noteworthy of itself, involved resort to an in-
frequently used statute2 when the stockholders found themselves dead-
locked on a question affecting the management of the corporation. 
The plaintiff, holder of 50 percent of the stock, invoked the statute 
and sought the appointment of a receiver. The Supreme Judicial 
Court ultimately decided that there was no way of breaking the 
deadlock and exercised its discretionary power under the statute to 
order sale of all the assets and the dissolution of the corporation. 
The Zottu case serves as a reminder of one of the less commonly 
considered risks involved in using the corporate form. Persons associ-
ated together in business can so readily incorporate their venture that 
they often overlook the difficult problems which must be solved when 
basic disagreements occur. Although a partner can always compel 
the dissolution of a partnership,3 even before the expiration of its 
term,4 a dissatisfied stockholder can force a dissolution only in accord-
ance with the terms of the applicable statute.5 
The Massachusetts act 6 requires that the petition for dissolution be 
filed by the holders of not less than 40 percent of the outstanding voting 
9 Section 32 of the draft of a new business corporation statute, prepared by a 
committee of the Boston Bar Association and now under study, would restore cumu-
lative voting on a permissive basis. The draft is discussed in §6.5 infra. 
§6.2. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 959, 135 N.E.2d 920. 
2 C.L., c. 155, §50. 
3 C.L., c. lOBA, §31(1)(b). 
4 Id., §31(2). 
II C.L., c. 155, §50. 
6 Ibid. 
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stock. Two basic types of deadlock may serve as the basis for a petition: 
(I) an equal division of the votes of the board of directors and the 
stockholders on a question affecting the general management of the 
affairs of the corporation, or (2) an equal division of the votes of 
the stockholders in the election of directors. The court, if it finds 
that there appears to be no way of reaching an agreement and breaking 
the deadlock, may decree a dissolution. 
Although reported decisions under the statute are sparse, it is clear 
that the court may order a dissolution of even a prosperous corpora-
tion/ despite some suggestion to the contrary in a case decided under 
an earlier version of the statute.8 A somewhat similar New York 
statute,9 however, has been strictly construed by the courts of that state, 
particularly in the case of solvent corporations;lO and dissolution has 
been denied upon a failure to show that the relief sought would be 
beneficial to the stockholders and noninjurious to the public.u The 
New York decisions may be warranted by the different language of the 
New York statute, but as a general proposition the courts should 
recognize that in the case of the closely held corporation at least, a 
deadlock among the stockholders is like a deadlock among partners.12 
And since a dissatisfied partner can always compel dissolution,13 the 
court should not hesitate to dissolve the hopelessly deadlocked corpora-
tion.14 
§6.3. Corporate loans to stockholders: Director's liability. An-
other corporate statute which is not frequently invoked was at issue in 
National Refractories Co. v. Bay State Builders Supply CO.1 The 
statute in question2 subjects a director to personal liability for assenting 
to a loan by the corporation to a stockholder or director; liability is 
limited to the amount of the loan and to debts contracted between the 
time the loan is made and its repayment. In the National Refractories 
case the defendant had resigned as director prior to the actual making 
of the loan to the stockholder, but upon a showing that the defendant 
7 Zottu v. Electronic Heating Corp., 1956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 959,961, 135 N.E.2d 920, -\ 
923. 
8 Cook v. Cook, 270 Mass. 534,542, 170 N.E. 455, 457 (1930). 
9 N.Y. Cen. Corp. Law, art. 9, §103. 
10 Radom v. Nerdoff, 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954); Matter of Homer Fabrics, 
Inc., 137 N.y.s.2d 701 (1955). 
11 Matter of Norton and Schneider, 137 N.Y.S.2d 269 (1954). 
12 Cf. Casey v. Harrington, 136 N.Y.L.]., No. 101, p. 13 (Sup. Ct. 1956), in which 
the court permitted dissolution of a deadlocked prosperous corporation on the 
ground that the two shareholders by disregarding corporate formalities had in fact 
become partners. 
13 C.L., c. IOBA, §31. 
14 Section 91 of the draft of the new business corporation statute now under study 
by the Boston Bar Association committee would require a showing of actual or 
threatened irreparable injury to the corporation before the court could order liqui-
dation of the deadlocked corporation, although such prooJ.i<would not be necessary 
where there was a deadlock in the election of directors. The petition could be 
brought by any stockholder, irrespective of the amount of his holdings. 
§6.3. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1069, 137 N.E.2d 221. 
2 C.L., c. 156, §37. 
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had actively participated in the transaction while still a director and 
that the loan proceeds were used by the borrower to repay a personal 
debt to the defendant, the Court very properly imposed liability. 
Since corporate loans to stockholders and directors are a common 
practice in the closely held enterprise, directors who approve such 
a loan should be aware of the risks involved if insolvency were to ensue 
before the loan was repaid. Perhaps the most dangerous situation is 
where the director has severed his connection with the corporation 
while the loan is still outstanding. Since the liability continues even 
as to future creditors, the departing director would be well advised 
to seek some kind of indemnity. The statute of limitations affords 
him little protection, since the cause of action does not arise until the 
creditor (perhaps many years later) makes written demand for payment 
on the corporation and payment is not made within ten days 
thereafter.3 
§6.4. Nonprofit corporations: Annual reports. Prior to 1955 cer-
tain types of nonprofit corporations were required to file annual re-
ports with the State Secretary by November 1, setting forth the address, 
date of annual meeting, and the names and addresses of the officers and 
directors of the organization.! In 1955 the legislature broadened the 
scope of corporations obligated to make such returns to include sub-
stantially all nonprofit corporations organized under Chapter 180 of the 
General Laws except for churches and medical schools.2 
Although the return requirement was not onerous, it obviously did 
not make much sense to exempt churches and schools of medicine and 
yet include the nonprofit schools, colleges, and hospitals. Accordingly, 
the statute was further amended in 1956 3 so that under the present law 
virtually all charitable corporations, as well as social, fraternal, and 
trade groups, must file returns with the exception of churches, religious 
organizations, nonprofit schools, colleges, or hospitals, and certain 
political organizations. 
§6.5. Model business corporation act. One of the most significant 
developments in Massachusetts corporate law during the 1956 SURVEY 
year was the completion of the draft of a revised business corporation 
statute for Massachusetts by a committee working under the auspices 
of the Boston Bar Association. The new statute is largely modeled 
after the Model Business Corporation Act prepared by the Committee 
on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association. Several states 
have in recent years adopted modified versions of the Model Act, and 
the Bar Association committee has attempted to synthesize its provisions 
with those of the present Massachusetts statute. Copies of the draft 
have been circulated among members of the bar for study and 
comment. 
8 G.L., c. 156, §38. 
§6.4. 1 G.L., c. 180, §26A. 
2 Acts of 1955, c. 290. 
B Acts of 1956, c. 390. 
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